10 Questions

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington in July couldn’t have taken place at a more fortuitous time in U.S.-India relations. Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Stephen P. Cohen has labored for over four decades to savor this high point in relations between the two great democracies. Fresh from publishing his latest book, “The Idea of Pakistan,” and busy working on creating a permanent India Center in the nation’s capital, Cohen spoke to Sunil Adam about, well, U.S., India and Pakistan

1. Mr. Manmohan Singh, for some very valid reasons, is seen as a figurehead Prime Minister, while the real power is vested in Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi. Does the peculiar status of Mr. Singh undermine the significance and substance of the forthcoming U.S.-India summit?

Not at all, he certainly has the confidence of his party, including Sonia Gandhi, and is in any case widely respected in his own right – as a wise and serious leader, with unique expertise in economic matters. The larger problem is how India will continue on with coalition governments, some of which are going to fall – and how the U.S. accommodates itself to this reality. So far, the transition to the BJP, and from BJP to Congress, has been smooth as far as American policy is concerned. I don’t see any reason why Indian party politics will upset the relationship in the future – unless one or another coalition member decides to make it an issue.

2. Lately, there has been a lot of talk about India and the United States taking ‘New Steps in Strategic Partnership.’ But, as things stand today, the U.S. is unwilling to support India’s permanent membership in the U.S. Security Council with veto power, and India is reluctant to settle for anything less. Given this stalemate, don’t you think there are limits to the kind of relationship that the two countries can realistically forge? And don’t you think the denial of full membership to the Security Council gives lie to the notion that the U.S. sees India as a strategic counter to China in the Asian balance of power?

If India wants to make SC membership, with veto, the test of the relationship with the U.S., then we might as well all go home right now. If India wants American support for a greater role in international organizations, then that has already been achieved. This was one of the points made by Secretary Rice in her recent trip to India, and it signified a major change in American policy (lost in the noise over the F-16 sale to Pakistan). Indian officials realize that even if the U.S. wanted to have India as a veto-wielding member of the SC, it is not in America’s power to bring this about. I believe that the Indian government is itself more realistic about this issue than some of the columnists. There may be a good chance of bringing India on as a non-veto wielding permanent SC member, along with Japan and a few other countries. In my view, one step at a time is the way to go.

3. In any case, given the interdependency factor in the globalized world dominated by information technologies – and the consequent interlocked economic structures and interests of the U.S., China and India – don’t you think the traditional notions of balance of power are redundant?

I certainly do. In the “old” days, great powers could contemplate, and even prepare for, war with each other as they jockeyed for status, influence and power. Now, however, all of the major powers, with the exception of Germany and Japan, are nuclear-armed, and the lesson of the Cold War, as well as Soviet-U.S.-China relations,
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is that nuclear powers dare not press each other very hard. This does not mean that competition and a struggle for influence has stopped, it just takes other forms, notably, low-level conflict, the exercise of “soft” power (something India does very well now), and economic power (something India is learning how to wield).

4. How much is American dependency on Pakistan (both current, in terms of the war on terrorism, and long-term, in terms of halting the spread of Islamic fundamental-ism) a factor in the U.S. effort to deny India full membership in the Security Council? In other words, is Washington (among other things) placating Islamabad by denying New Delhi access to a seat at the high table?

This is a question that, in effect, asks me how long I have been beating my wife. I think it is clear that Islamabad’s views played no role in the SC seat decision – the fact is that there are a number of countries, led by China, that would deny India a seat, and the U.S. cannot do much about that. Instead, we should look ahead: if India and Pakistan were to settle some of their outstanding issues, then Pakistan’s resistance to a seat for India might lessen, and India’s case as a stable and responsible great power would certainly be enhanced. More important, of course, is to get India into other international bodies, notably the G-8, and some of the missile and nuclear control regimes. This would indicate that we have at last gotten over our hang-up regarding India’s nuclear tests. I am certain that this is the Administration’s strategy; indeed, no administration has been as supportive of India as this one, and the second term has already led to some important breakthroughs. Let us hope that India responds accordingly.

5. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, you have suggested that the U.S. should support India’s membership in the G-8 group of developed nations. Did you mean it as a sop – in lieu of full membership in the Security Council?

No, the G-8 is both important and do-able. I would ask: what purpose would it serve for the U.S. to put its muscle behind a proposal (SC membership with veto) that is doomed? India does not need to persuade the U.S. that SC membership is desirable, it has to persuade China and other major countries that do not want to see India push ahead of them, or which, like Pakistan, want to hold India back. A realist, Jaswant Singh, said the other day in Brookings that the SC is like an Indian railway compartment where the occupants lock themselves in to keep others out. Regretfully, this is true for a while, but other institutions are also important; India should be brought onto them as soon as possible.

6. You have argued that the U.S. should support the view that “Kashmir is a human rights issue, not merely one of territory or international law.” And such an approach, you said, would make a final settlement easier: In other words, are you suggesting here that the U.S. should support a formalization of the status quo as the only solution to the Kashmir question?

I don’t think that matters would be helped by a U.S. declaration of what a final settlement should look like, although it might want to do so at some time in the future if that would help the parties reach an agreement. However, private individuals and groups ought to be speaking out, offering suggestions and ideas; the Stimson Center has gathered on its website a list of at least two dozen such proposals; doing this is useful in moving the debate on Kashmir along, especially in Pakistan.

7. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, you maintained that the current thaw in India-Pakistan relations would not last. That may be a very objective and realistic assessment. But who profits from an extended India-Pakistan rivalry? Would you agree that India has the most to lose, while Pakistan, China and, willy-nilly, even the U.S., may have some vested interest in it?

I hope I am wrong, but I certainly don’t see a breakthrough coming soon. No one profits from continuing regional hostility, including the United States, but some par-
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ties may find it in their interest to block a solution. Here, one can think of elements in Pakistan, perhaps China, and possibly some Indians who want to continue pressure on Pakistan until that state cracks. I think that this is a case where a conflict has emerged, and no one can figure out how to resolve it; at one time India considered using force, but backed down; now, with the presence of nuclear weapons, even force is ruled out.

8. Your recent book, “The Idea of Pakistan,” has received rave reviews from both U.S. and South Asian critics, including many Pakistani scholars, despite the fact that it provides a very pessimistic view of the future of Pakistan. Do you think anything short of a Marshall Plan for Pakistan will extricate that nation from the predicament that it is in?

Even a Marshall Plan might not work, because Pakistan’s problems are deeper than mere economic reform. It is also politically malformed, with the army playing too large a role. Also, of course, it is very insecure, something that guarantees that the military will continue to play a major role in politics (and now the economy). The book also argues that India is the one state that can influence Pakistan’s future the most. I’m very pleased at recent Indian policy, notably the opening up to Pakistani scholars, journalists, and ordinary people. This won’t provide a solution, but it may make one easier to develop.

9. By focusing mainly on the negatives – like Pakistan, F-16s, etc. – do you think the influential Indian American community has squandered an opportunity to lobby for a more substantial prize – India’s full membership in the Security Council? What are the weaknesses in Indian American lobbying strategies?

The lobbying has to take place in Beijing and Paris, not Washington, as far as this issue is concerned. I find it interesting that the Indian American community seems to be more excited about the F-16s than the Indian government! The community seems oblivious to the major change in U.S. policy that has taken place; I’m sure they will catch up with reality soon, but I’m afraid that they are being manipulated by politicians who feel that by taking an extreme and uncritical pro-Indian stance they are doing India a favor. All “ethnic” lobbies go through this phase, of course, where the diaspora is more worried than those who remain in the former homeland. I’m also concerned that the F-16 issue is less one of being pro-Indian than being uncritically anti-Pakistani. For all of its faults, Pakistan is not a trivial state, and in the long run India and Pakistan will have to learn how to live with each other.

10. For over three decades you have single-handedly promoted American understanding of South Asia. Even your detractors in the Subcontinent acknowledge your seminal contribution to the promotion of American scholarship in South Asian strategic studies. Is there anything in particular that you want to accomplish in the coming years?

Thanks for the compliment! I’m pleased with what I have done over the last four decades, and that many of my students are themselves devoted to clearing up the many misunderstandings between the U.S. and India. My major goal now is to work with Strobe Talbot and others at Brookings to create a permanent India and South Asia center. Astonishingly, there is no such center in Washington, the capital of our country! We want to be able to provide authoritative and timely information about India, and Indian-American relations, and continue to work with Congress, the Executive Branch, and others. To this end we are about to launch a major fund raising drive, and I welcome comments from your readers.

President George W. Bush and First Lady Laura Bush greet Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when they met at the 60th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II in Moscow in May 2005. The two met in Washington, D.C. in July for Singh’s first official visit to the United States.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi and U.S. Ambassador to India David C. Mulford emerging after a meeting in New Delhi in March. The two countries have forged a viable mulifaceted relationship, albeit not without some irritants.